Recognition and criminal justice in the Gelman case

Abstract

This article examines two central aspects of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgment in the Case of Gelman v. Uruguay: on the one hand, the importance of the Uruguayan State’s recognition of responsibility and, on the other, the role played by criminal justice in the ruling. The author holds that the State’s recognition of responsibility reveals the existence of a new starting point in discussions about violent pasts and the current requirements of democracy, and is the lens through which the remaining conclusions contained in the ruling should be viewed. With regards to the way in which criminal justice is dealt with in the ruling –particularly the validity of the Uruguayan Amnesty Law– the author argues that the reasoning underlines the active nature of the debate on the role of criminal punishment in late transitions and on the limitations of the Inter-American Court when faced with majoritarian decisions made by domestic communities. In the face of this consideration, the Court’s decision cannot be properly evaluated without taking into account the historical and normative context in which it is inserted.